作者太会讲故事了，虽然这本的书的主题似乎是说人类根据别人的表情，动作作出的判断经常是错误的，因此我们常常被人骗。但是你把这个当作真实故事集来看就好了，没必要纠结什么主题。作者讲了几个case 都很有趣。
1. 一个黑人女大学生被白人警察扣押，导致自杀狱中。他们之间的沟通出了问题，本来事情本不不应该发展到这一步。
2. 古巴间谍在美国cia, 潜伏多年，居然都没人发现，况且她的表现并不高明。说明人类总是倾向于相信而不是去怀疑，除非反向证据太多。
3，金融大佬 berni madoff 的旁氏骗局，为什么能骗那么多人，那么多年。
4. Penn state university/ jerry Sandusky
michigan state university/ Larry nassor
大学里发生的性侵案，为什么大学管理方总是无视问题的存在，间接纵容了犯罪。
5. 面部表情的解读并不是通用的，也不是总是有效的。我们根据对方的表情判断对方的情绪，但是这并不可靠。AMANDA KNOX的案子，就因为AMANDA没有人们所希望的那样表现的伤心，警方就怀疑她是有罪的。这很荒唐。
6. 人们在酒醉以后对自己的行为和意识会失去控制，所以涉及到醉酒的性侵就很难判断当事人是否是自愿的。发生在斯坦福校园的一起案件就是女生喝醉了，男生认为女方同意，但实际上女生当时已经喝醉了，无法做出正常的判断。醉酒会引起人的长期记忆缺失，也就是black out.
7. Silvia Plath 著名女诗人的自杀案例。因为当时伦敦使用煤气取暖，煤气中含有大量一氧化碳，所以用煤气自杀很普遍，特别是女性更多。因为煤气太容易得到，死的又没有痛苦，成功率也高，所以当时整个英国的自杀率都特别高。后来英国逐渐使用天然气取代煤气以后，整个自杀率都大幅下降了，所以有的时候环境是会影响人的决定，某个特定地点，因素消失以后，人的行为也会发生改变，因为煤气自杀不再那么容易，那么很多人就不自杀了。
8. 美国旧金山的金门大桥很多人在这里自杀，也是这种效应，如果大桥装了网子或者护栏，真的可以阻止很多自杀的发生，因为自杀的人，就是对这个特定的地点，这个方式想要自杀，如果这个方式不再可行，那么他们就不会自杀了。
7. Taxes Kansas city 的警察积极出警降低犯罪率的案例。Kansas City 长期以来枪支泛滥，谋杀率很高，后来有人提出让街上的巡警采取更加积极的态度拦住街上的可疑车辆，进行询问和搜查就能更加主动的识别犯罪分子，没收非法枪支。这个方式证明很有用，因为警察不能随便搜查住家，但是只要有合理的理由就可以搜查你的车。所以Kansas的犯罪率大幅度下降了，因为罪犯害怕被警察在大街上拦住。后来别的城市也采用这种方式，让警察更加积极的执法，可是却产生了悲剧。因为这个方法不适合在本来就治安不错的城市，警察经常拦人只会使居民反感，而且容易激化种族矛盾。本书一开始的案例就是如此，那个黑人女生本来根本没做错什么，就被警察拦住搜查，她本来就对种族关系很敏感，觉得就因为自己是黑人才被拦下，所以态度就很不配合，而警察因为她的态度更加觉得她有问题，所以最后产生了悲剧。
作者最后的结论是想说，虽然我们可能会被陌生人骗，但是为了避免这个，就假设陌生人都会坏人更加不可取。毕竟这只是少数。为了社会和谐，我们还是应该先把别人往好处想。其实这个结论蛮牵强的。也不算什么科学。这本书就本故事看蛮好。
The latest intellectually stimulating book from the acclaimed author.
Every few years, journalist Gladwell (David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants, 2013, etc.) assembles serious scientific research on oddball yet relevant subjects and then writes a bestseller. Readers expecting another everything-you-think-you-know-is-wrong page-turner will not be disappointed, but they will also encounter some unsettling truths. The author begins with a few accounts of black Americans who died at the hands of police, using the incidents to show how most of us are incompetent at judging strangers. Countless psychological studies demonstrate that humans are terrible at detecting lying. Experts such as FBI agents don’t perform better. Judges interview suspects to determine if they deserve bail; they believe it helps, but the opposite is true. Computers, using only hard data, do much better. Many people had qualms about Bernie Madoff, but interviewers found him completely open and honest; “he was a sociopath dressed up as a mensch.” This, Gladwell emphasizes, is the transparency problem. We believe that someone’s demeanor reflects their thoughts and emotions, but it often doesn’t. Gladwell’s second bombshell is what he calls “default to truth.” It seems like a university president resigns in disgrace every few months for the same reason: They hear accusations of abusive behavior by an employee—e.g., Larry Nassar at Michigan State, Jerry Sandusky at Penn State—conduct an investigation, but then take no action, often claiming that they did not have enough evidence of deceit. Ultimately, everyone agrees that they were criminally negligent. Another example is CIA official James Angleton, who was convinced that there was a Soviet mole in the agency; his decades of suspicion and search ruined careers and crippled American intelligence. Gladwell emphasizes that society could not function if we did not give everyone the benefit of the doubt. “To assume the best of another is the trait that has created modern society,” he writes. “Those occasions when our trusting nature is violated are tragic. But the alternative—to abandon trust as a defense against predation and deception—is worse.”
Another Gladwell tour de force but perhaps his most disturbing.